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Introduction
A. State v. Ford Motor Co.: The Moral Dilemma of Prosecuting White-Collar Crime
On August 10, 1978, after an official for Ford Motor Co. determined that the cost of fixing
a defective design in Ford’s Pinto outweighed the value of human life,1 a fatal accident took the
lives of three high school girls on their way to a basketball game when a van struck them. While
the driver of the van sustained only minor injuries, the girls were consumed by flames after the
Pinto was ignited within microseconds due to a defective design in its fuel tank.2 Although Ford
had previously estimated that approximately 180 lives could be saved by correcting the defective
design, it assigned a value of $200,000 to each life and calculated the cost of improving the fuel
tank of each of its 12.5 million vehicles at $11 per fuel tank. Ford determined that the most
lucrative approach would be to handle the potential 180 wrongful death claims. The three teenage
girls were immolated by a cost-benefit analysis performed by the corporation. In an Indiana state
court, a grand jury formally charged with three counts of reckless homicide, not the driver of the
van, but Ford Motor Co. What followed was the landmark case commonly referred to as the “Pinto
case,” the first time a corporation—the world’s fourth-largest corporation3—faced criminal
charges arising out of a defective design.4
The Pinto case was controversial from its inception, as even some Indiana natives believed
that “[i] t will be the public that pays for it if [the prosecutor] wins,”5 while emphasizing that [i]t’s
another thing that’s going to increase prices,” reflecting the still endemic dilemma of prosecuting
corporate crime. The moral dilemma in prosecuting corporate crime is grounded on whether the
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government is justified in providing a judicial forum that criminally charges corporations, to allow
communities to express their outrage over unconscionable business decisions, at the expense of
the potential for economic devastation of companies and consequently, their employees and
shareholders.6
When confronted with corporate crime, prosecutors operate within a dynamic framework
that encompasses social, legal, and economic considerations that determine the set of tools used to
prosecute corporate wrongdoing. A quintessential example of this framework is the Pinto case,
reflecting the disastrous collateral consequences for Ford’s employees and stockholders associated
with prosecuting corporate crime. Although collateral consequences are virtually present in any
criminal prosecution, they are critical in corporate crime because of the potentially deleterious
effects on third parties. Moreover, there is a distinct juxtaposition in the prosecution of
corporations and natural persons. In prosecuting corporations as nonhuman defendants,
prosecutors are likely to face challenges proving the requisite culpable mental state of mind
associated with the criminal charges beyond a reasonable doubt. Conversely, prosecutors appear
to have the upper hand in the liability arena as the doctrine of respondeat superior, widely used to
assert corporate liability, “has been expanded through common law adjudication to the point where
it is less a standard than a guarantor of liability.”7 This study identifies the interplay among
economic, social, and legal factors and how they affect corporate prosecution.
In making these claims, this Article will proceed as follows: Part I will provide a
comprehensive overview of the realities of corporate prosecution, including broad economic
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concerns faced by prosecutors and the current state of the law. Part II conveys the prosecutorial
methods implemented in light of the current state of affairs, including using independent external
monitors to oversee a corporation and the excessive reliance on Non-Prosecution Agreements
(NPAs) and Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs). Part III explores the detrimental policy
fluctuations of the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) resulting from the absence of a wellstructured legislative framework to combat corporate crime. Lastly, Part IV will attempt to proffer
relevant insight into the subject matter by recapitulating the interplay of the current state of the
law and current prosecution methods to ultimately offer potential solutions to halt corporate crime.

I.

REALITIES OF CORPORATE PROSECUTION

Sam Buell, one of the leading experts in white-collar crime and one of the prosecutors in
the infamous Enron case, believes that “there is an ample dose of raw schadenfreude” when it
comes to people’s desire for having white-collar criminals prosecuted.8 White-collar criminals
rarely pose a risk of flight and have usually been in contact with law enforcement through counsel
prior to their arrest. However, federal agents often insist on parading the accused while in
handcuffs in public view as he is taken into FBI’s offices or the courthouse.9 This “perp walk” is
staged, as “people want to see the business criminal treated the same as the street offender.”1011
The public perception regarding the prosecution of white-collar crime must undoubtedly be
aligned with that of prosecuting corporate crime. A notable difference between white-collar crime
and corporate crime is that white-collar crime often refers to those crimes committed by
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businessmen as an adjunct to their regular business activities. While corporate crime is a crime
committed by a corporation's representatives acting on its behalf, the most apparent distinction
between the two is that a corporation cannot be deprived of liberty as a natural person. However,
corporations may nonetheless face the shattering effects of a felony conviction.
A.

Economic Concerns as Collateral Consequences in Prosecuting Corporate Crime
Corporations labeled as felons are precluded from engaging in commercial transactions

with the federal government. This practice is known as debarment. According to Bloomberg’s
Freedom of Information Request to the GSA (General Services Administration), just in the 2010
fiscal year, the federal government acquired 21,980 vehicles from Ford. Similarly, corporations
may also suffer from “exclusion.” Exclusion occurs when a corporation is excluded from
participating in federal programs such as Medicare. Therefore, “debarment or exclusion upon
conviction risk substantial injury to innocent third parties—i.e., employees, stockholders, and
consumers—and to the national economy as a whole.” 12 Regardless of their respective motives,
“[t]he characteristics of corporate criminal law result in an unusual state of affairs: neither a
corporation nor a federal prosecutor has an incentive to take a corporate criminal case to trial.”13
B.
Scienter Issues: A Contributing Factor to the Disparity between Street Crime and WhiteCollar Crime
The Ford Pinto was designed and manufactured in 1973, while the revised Indiana Criminal
Code did not become effective until October 1, 1976.14 The prosecutor was then left with the
challenging task of proving that Ford’s recklessness was premised on its failure to recall the
vehicles after October 1, 1976.15 In light of ex post facto considerations, the trial court Judge ruled
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that the documents relating to Ford’s decision not to improve the defective fuel tanks were
inadmissible as they were “pretty far remote from the issue.”16 The prosecutor’s efforts were
unsuccessful at last, and Ford was ultimately acquitted.
Typically, prosecutors will face a heavier burden proving a scienter element in a whitecollar case than they do in street crimes.17 The essential scienter element of criminal charges tends
to be more difficult to prove beyond reasonable doubt when prosecuting corporations. In the Pinto
case, a document existed that could have demonstrated Ford’s recklessness (assuming arguendo
the absence of evidentiary issues). However, in a different case, the apportionment of culpability
would not be so clear. For example, would it be proper for the prosecution to blame the
corporation's senior management for failing to familiarize themselves with every intricate detail
of the manufacturing design?18 Or perhaps the chief engineer’s negligence should be established
in order to prove the corporation’s recklessness in the criminal case?
The “collective knowledge” doctrine serves to attribute knowledge of a corporation’s
employees and agents to the corporation as an entity.19 However, the corporation must act with the
requisite culpable mental state as determined by the applicable statute, which usually involves
imputing the mental state of individual employees or agents to the corporation.20 The problem with
prosecuting corporate managers for financial transgressions that occur within their supervision is
that recklessness as a culpable mental state of mind is typically insufficient (e.g., knowledge is
required in criminal fraud by federal statute), and most “often, knowledge at the top of the
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corporation is lacking.”21 It also is worth noting that if no individual employee has the requisite
mental state of mind, corporate liability can still be imposed if the corporate employees possess
the mental state collectively, 22 which in and of itself poses its complications. These complex
questions reflect some of the scienter challenges prosecutors face, even before facing the complex
predicament that arises during the sentencing phase.
C.

Respondeat Superior as a Guarantor of Liability
Respondeat superior makes a corporation vicariously liable for the acts of its agents

committed within the scope of the agent’s employment and for the benefit of the corporation. The
doctrine was transposed verbatim into criminal law upon the ruling of the Supreme Court in New
York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States in 1909.23 This landmark spearheaded
the movement towards bringing criminal charges against corporations. The court applied the
traditionally civil doctrine of respondeat superior to avoid having certain offenses go
unpunished.24 The Court relied on Congress’s Commerce Clause authority to regulate interstate
commerce, such as railroad companies, effectively expanding the respondeat superior into
criminal law. The controversial ruling allows a corporation to be held criminally responsible for
acts of its employees regardless of whether the corporation had explicitly prohibited such conduct.
For example, “[e]vidence that a corporation took all reasonable steps to prevent the misconduct
through a robust compliance program…is simply irrelevant to the question of liability.”25
The overbreadth of the application of the respondeat superior doctrine is stringent to the
point that it leaves corporations without the practical ability to contest criminal cases.26 The
21
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contention is that “[i]f the de jure rule makes corporations almost always guilty, then the de facto
rule becomes that corporations must always roll over for the Justice Department.”27 Scholars have
posited that “the respondeat superior standard has been expanded through common law
adjudication to the point where it is less a standard than a guarantor of liability.”28 By expanding
the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior into criminal cases, corporations are inclined
to resolve matters via settlement, which results in corporations waiving their sacrosanct right to a
jury trial. The consequences of such waiver are severe, as it jeopardizes constitutional safeguards
in place to rein in overly aggressive prosecutors; without the threat of trial, prosecutors might be
less likely to act reasonably. Conversely, a plausible argument could be made that in light of the
schadenfreude29 a corporation must overcome in presenting a case to a jury, they may be better off
resorting to settlement. However, this argument would fail as a defendant corporation still has the
alternative of seeking a bench trial.

II.

PROSECUTORIAL METHODS IN LIGHT OF THE REALITIES OF
CORPORATE PROSECUTION

Corporate criminal liability is a corollary to the law’s treatment of corporations as persons,
and the Sentencing Guidelines of 1999 codified that principle. The central thrust of the Sentencing
Guidelines is grounded on its carrot and stick policy which, by virtue of the carrot, encourages
corporations to identify violations while reserving the stick for violators. For instance, a
compliance program approved under the Guidelines would require a corporation to detect
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violations,30 discipline the perpetrator, and subsequently disclose both actions to the appropriate
authorities.31 Under the Guidelines, a corporation would also benefit from the disclosure of
remedial measures following the violation, as well as for full cooperation. Presently, in order to
obtain full cooperation credit, the corporation must disclose, inter alia, “information... sufficient
for law enforcement personnel to identify…the individual(s) responsible for the criminal
conduct.”32 The Sentencing Guidelines incentivized corporations by limiting their fine exposure,
in consideration of the corporation taking steps to increase the likelihood that the individuals
responsible for financial crimes be held accountable for their misconduct.33 They are carefully
crafted to create a wedge between corporation and employee by encouraging corporations to
reduce their fine exposure by identifying employees who may have committed violations.
A.
Corporation’s Dual Role as Suspect and Enforcer: External Independent Monitors as a
Common Feature of DPAs and NPAs
The current state of the law, “arrived at over twenty years or so, in a kind of ad hoc
developments of practices by prosecutors, corporate defense lawyers and companies,”34 requires
corporations to act as both criminal suspect and enforcer, as the state commonly relies on the
corporation to detect, prove and punish business crime. 35 A common denominator among DPAs
and NPAs is to require a corporation, at its own cost, “to rehabilitate itself” by hiring an expensive
outside “monitor” sometimes for several years.36 The monitoring process may occur within the
confines of the corporation, and the monitoring staff has the ability to inspect, ask questions,
receive complaints, and report to prosecutors. The imposition of external monitors substantially
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increases the cost companies pay in order to settle with the Justice Department. Company officials
have repeatedly voiced their concerns over how little leverage to negotiate fees, monitoring costs,
or the monitor’s roles and responsibilities. These external monitors usually have an absolute
decision-making authority to determine whether the company is in compliance with the agreement
reached with the DOJ,37

38

and “for whatever reasons, monitors wield tremendous, relatively

unchallenged power over their subject companies’ operations.” 39
Corporations do not enjoy the same constitutional privacy protections as natural citizens.
Any protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches can be
circumvented by a duly issued subpoena, which is the primary tool for gathering evidence in whitecollar crime investigations.40 Similarly, corporations do not have a Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination.41 Consequently, corporations are fighting an uphill battle in which “even the
mention by prosecutors of a potential charge against the corporation has to be treated as if it were
a death threat. Any prospect of contesting the litigation vanishes.” 42 Interestingly enough, the role
of the corporation as enforcer has become so prevalent that corporate lawyers have expressed their
discontent with having “been turned into nothing more than ‘deputy prosecutors’ whose job is to
investigate their own clients.”43 A considerable shortcoming of this “automated self-enforcement
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process” is that if cases are rarely litigated, there could be (at least in theory) innocent corporations
settling with the Justice Department to avoid engaging in a losing battle.
The practice of prosecutors meddling into a corporation’s business affairs has been widely
criticized. After all, it has been contended that “prosecutors are English majors with law degrees”44
who are not qualified to run corporations. Moreover, the incorporation of monitors in “pre-trial
diversion agreements are being negotiated by assistant U.S. Attorneys whose knowledge of the
subject industry and specific entity may, at an early stage in the process, be too limited to enable
them to draft a narrow charge.”45 The use of DPAs and NPAs requires that prosecutors monitor
the corporation, as well as to conduct structural reforms to its operations, however, it has been
repeatedly argued that “such reforms lies outside prosecutors’ realm of expertise and authority.”46
B.
Complacent Prosecutors: Excessive Reliance on Deferred Prosecution Agreements and
Non-Prosecution Agreements
Extensive research has shown that prosecutors are drifting away from their duties of
prosecuting crime to reform the corporate structure by excessively relying on DPAs and NPAs.47
Critics of the situation continue to argue that prosecutors are tasked with enforcing the law through
litigation. They are not experts on structural corporate governance reformation.48 Which in turn,
begs the question of whether federal prosecutors are competent to implement effective DPAs and
NPAs if those require complex structural reforms.49 Nevertheless, the widespread use of DPAs
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and NPAs dramatically increased in 2004 compared to 2001, which is the year of inception of
DPAs and NPAs in corporate prosecutions.50 Between 2001 and 2004, the DOJ entered into a total
of thirteen settlement agreements.51 By 2004, the DOJ was resolving an average of thirteen cases
per year through the use of DPAs or NPAs. However, between 2006 and 2021, the average of
cases settled through DPAs or NPAs was approximately 31 per year. 52
Another concern surrounding the excessive usage of NPAs is the absence of judicial
monitoring. While DPAs enjoy limited oversight as certain aspects of DPAs have to be approved
by the court, NPAs do not enjoy this additional safeguard as charges are never filed. 53 This practice
exposes NPAs to claims of lack of partiality, as they rely entirely on the prosecutor’s discretion,
regardless of potential harm to the public.54 Furthermore, the use of DPAs and NPAs to resolve
white-collar crime allows corporations to infer potential fines and perform a cost-benefit analysis
to calculate the risk of financial exposure, as in the Pinto case. If a corporation decides that it is
lucrative to bear said risk of exposure by escaping prosecution with monetary fines, it cannot be
said that such corporation was deterred from engaging in criminal conduct. On the contrary, the
lack of individual accountability, as it presently stands, fails to deter individuals in managerial
positions from engaging in criminal conduct. The DOJ’s customary reliance on DPAs generates
the impression, at least at first glance, that companies are able to buy their way out of prosecution.
On the other side of the spectrum, it has been argued that prosecutors, highly aware of their upper
hand, can get complacent, “even lazy”55 in their positions. Because prosecutors can get
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corporations to go through the same evidence-collection procedures, that will eventually reach the
same sort of settlement, producing the same sort of check for the government,”56 prosecutors do
not have an incentive to scrutinize individual cases, much less to “make careful distinctions among
them.”57 In their defense, it has also been argued that federal prosecutors lack the resources to
compete with the deep coffers of large corporations able to spend millions on high-powered
defense firms.58
Regardless of the DOJ’s motive for the wide usage of NPAs and DPAs, white-collar
defense attorneys have come to heavily rely upon this settlement practice in order to circumvent
the rigorous application of respondeat superior to corporate crime, along with the grave collateral
consequences of a conviction, including disbarment and exclusion for a corporation.59

III.

A.

COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE’S POLICY FLUCTUATIONS PROSECUTING CORPORATE
CRIME

The Evolution of the Triangle Relationship between Corporation, Employee, and State
In previous administrations, corporations have been faced with a double-edged sword when

the DOJ assesses their cooperation on the basis of waiving basic legal protections such as the
attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine, and the ability to secure legal counsel for their
employees. On the one hand, corporations have a vested interest in mitigating the criminal
exposure of (potentially disgruntled) former employees in order to avoid further legal

56
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consequences. On the other hand, this practice had been discouraged, and at some point, prohibited
by the DOJ.
In 1999, the Holder Memo memorialized the DOJ’s guidelines for federal prosecution of
corporations.60 As a result, the Holder Memo came to be known for its emphasis on cooperation.
Specifically, it recommended that prosecutors take into account, inter alia, whether the corporation
disclosed the complete results of internal investigations, advanced legal fees on behalf of its
employees, and waived its attorney-client and work-product privileges in order to assess the extent
of the corporation’s cooperation.61
On the heels of the Enron scandal, the Thompson Memo was released in 2003 reaffirming
previously established principles of the Holder Memo, except now binding prosecutors to follow
guidelines that were merely advisory under the Holder Memo, heightening pressure corporations.62
The Thompson Memo’s revisions served as de facto requirements for corporations to waive their
attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine as a prerequisite to consideration for
cooperation.63 In addition, the Thompson Memo encouraged federal prosecutors to scrutinize “the
authenticity of a corporation’s cooperation”64 by determining whether a corporation was
“purporting to cooperate” while actually impeding the investigation.65 For instance, the payment
of attorneys’ fees for the corporation’s employees or agents, even in a joint defense agreement,
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was considered an aggravating factor in determining cooperation and contributed to a
determination of “whether the corporation appears to be protecting its culpable employees and
agents.”66 Corporations, in turn, were compelled to demonstrate the “authenticity” of their
cooperation by resorting to increasingly creative measures, such as conditioning legal fees for
employees embroiled in the investigation on their agreement to provide testimony to prosecutors.67
In response to the prosecutorial overreach of the de facto prerequisite of waiving the
attorney-client and work-product privileges in exchange for cooperation credit, the Southern
District of New York ruled in United States v. Stein that scrutinizing the payment of employees’
defense costs by the corporation violated the Fifth Amendment due process clause and the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.68 In light of the District Court’s decision, and after acknowledging
that the “corporate legal community” had voiced their concerns regarding the waivers of legal
protections,69 The McNulty Memo was issued in 2006 as a band-aid. The McNulty Memo sought
to limit the practice of demanding waivers of legal protections in cases where there was a
“legitimate end,” and through the “least intrusive wavier necessary,” and only with authorization
from the assistant attorney general.70 However, the state’s appeal of the district court’s decision in
Stein continued to spark widespread criticism among “a wide range of commentators and members
of the American legal community and criminal justice system … that the Department’s policies

66
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have been used, either wittingly or unwittingly, to coerce business entities into waiving attorneyclient privilege and work-product protection.” 71
Once the Second Circuit affirmed Stein in August 2008,72 then-Deputy Attorney General,
Mark Filip, issued a new memorandum along the vein of the Court’s opinion. This time, the
implementation of DOJ policies was the product of “comments from other actors within the
criminal justice system, the judiciary, and the broader legal community” emphasizing “what
measures a business entity must take to qualify for the long-recognized ‘cooperation’ mitigating
factor, as well as how payment of attorneys’ fees by a business organization for its officers and
employees, or participation in a joint defense agreement, will be considered.”73 After the ruling in
Stein, the DOJ stands by its position issued in the Filip Memo (also known as the Principles of
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations) recognizing the constitutionality of the attorneyclient and work-product privileges, and no longer requires waivers of such legal protections in
exchange for a cooperation consideration. In fact, the Filip Memo, which is presently in effect,
specifically directs that “prosecutors should not ask for such waivers and are directed not to do
so.” 74 It further specifies that “mere participation of a corporation in a joint defense agreement
does not render the corporation ineligible to receive cooperation credit.”75 The implementations
reflected in the Filip Memorandum are still the prevalent view among DOJ policy and have served
as the framework to protect the sacrosanct legal protections.
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B.

The Yates Memo and its Emphasis on Individual Accountability
Grounded on the premise that corporate crime is committed by “flesh-and-blood people”

and thus prosecutorial practice should also incorporate individual wrongdoers, then-Deputy
Attorney General Sally Yates announced sweeping changes to DOJ Principles in its September
2015 Memo.76 In a nutshell, the Yates Memo required that prosecutors wishing to advance charges
against a corporation, without an accompanying charge for an individual, must explain the
“extraordinary circumstances” for such decision, as well obtain approval from the U.S. attorney of
the appropriate assistant attorney general.77 In addition, the Yates Memo came up with six “key
steps” that offers guidance for prosecuting individual wrongdoers:
(1)
in order to qualify for any cooperation credit, corporations must provide to
the Department all relevant facts relating to the individuals responsible for the
misconduct;
(2)
criminal and civil corporate investigations should focus on individuals from
the inception of the investigation;
(3)
criminal and civil attorneys handling corporate investigations should be in
routine communication with one another;
(4)
absent extraordinary circumstances or approved departmental policy, the
Department will not release culpable individuals from civil or criminal liability
when resolving a matter with a corporation;
(5)
Department attorneys should not resolve matters with a corporation without
a clear plan to resolve related individual cases, and should memorialize any
declinations as to individuals in such cases; and
(6)
civil attorneys should consistently focus on individuals as well as the
company and evaluate whether to bring suit against an individual based on
considerations beyond that individual's ability to pay. 78
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The central premise of the Yates Memo was the emphasis placed on the reporting
requirement in exchange for cooperation consideration. Particularly its requirement to identify all
culpable individuals in order to receive—not full cooperation credit—but to be considered as a
cooperating entity. The Yates Memo further encourages the prosecution of individuals by requiring
that prosecutors memorialize the reasons for any declination of prosecution against individuals,
imposing ongoing cooperation obligations for corporations. However, some of the most palpable
effects of the Yates Memo are the stringent cooperation requirements, which apply even in the
case of senior management, as well as the requirement to identify and actively procure evidence
against violators.
Some critics have opined that the Yates Memo is merely a public message released
preceding an election year, as the DOJ already had a track record for prosecuting individuals.79
Following the Yates Memo, the Justice Department continued to rely on the use of DPAs over full
prosecution, which resulted in individual wrongdoers continue avoiding accountability.80 In
support of this conclusion, it is readily apparent that in the couple of years following the Yates
Memo, prosecutions of individuals declined,81 even though the central thrust of the memo is
grounded on individual accountability. The Yates Memo failed to substantiate its intent to enhance
individual accountability by providing prosecutors with a procedural vehicle in order to achieve
its objective, as the Yates Memo did not limit the use of DPAs and NPAs.82

79

Matt Apuzzo & Ben Protess, Justice Department Sets Sights on Wall Street Executives, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9,
2015,,http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/10/us/politics/new-justicedept-rules-aimed-at-prosecuting-corporateexecutives.html [https://perma.cc/72AF-GN94]
80
OFFICE OF SEN. ELIZABETH WARREN, RIGGED JUSTICE: 2016: HOW WEAK ENFORCEMENT LETS
CORPORATE OFFENDERS OFF EASY (2016)
81
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), Corporate and White-Collar Prosecutions at All-Time
Lows, Syracuse University, Mar. 3, 2020, https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/597/
82
See RIGGED JUSTICE, supra note 62, at 1.

18

During the Trump administration, the Yates Memo was redefined, at least in the civil
context, by Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein.

83

In November 2018, Rosenstein

announced that the “all or nothing approach” of the Yates Memo was inefficient for civil cases
under the False Claims Act and allowed for corporations to obtain maximum credit to companies
that identify every individual substantially involved in the misconduct while still awarding some
credit to those corporations that cooperate in a “meaningfully” form without necessarily
identifying every employee with potential liability exposure.84

IV.
A.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO HALT CORPORATE CRIME

Invite Legislators to Legislate
Presently, it appears counterproductive to continue abiding by the doctrine set forth in such

an archaic ruling. A jury should not be able to decide the plight of an entire organization on the
basis of the misconduct of one of its employees. Accordingly, it has been suggested at the
American College of Trial Lawyers that perhaps the legislature should replace the doctrine with
the language of the Model Penal Code as the standard for securing a conviction in corporate
crime.85 Section 2.07(1) of the Model Penal Code provides in relevant part as follows:
the commission of the offense was authorized, requested, commanded, performed,
or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting
on behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office or employment…’High
managerial agent’ is defined as an officer of a corporation or an unincorporated
association, or, in the case of a partnership, a partner, or any other agent of a
corporation or association having duties of such responsibility that his conduct may
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fairly be assumed to represent the policy of the corporation or association.
(emphasis added) 86
The Model Penal Code imposes recklessness as to the requisite culpable mental state of
mind while not being as rigid as the application of the respondeat superior doctrine to civil cases.
While defining recklessness as a person who “…consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct.”87 If the
legislature adopts such a standard, prosecutors should devote their attention and resources to
prosecute. This modification would also rein prosecutors from engaging in the practice of
reforming corporate structures through the use of NPAs and DPAs.
B.

Enact Voluntary Asset Forfeiture Mechanisms as a Form of Restitution
Traditionally in criminal prosecutions, the concept of restitution has been an equitable

remedy to obtain justice and to restore a victim to an otherwise favorable condition. The enactment
of voluntary asset forfeiture regulations through quasi-criminal proceedings would be a formidable
tool to have corporate wrongdoers relinquish profits obtained through corporate wrongdoing.
Federal statutes have been akin to asset forfeiture under specific circumstances and upon the
commission of specific crimes.88 For example, the United States Code Service authorizes the
forfeiture of property of interest in property obtained or maintained in violation of racketeering
laws:
(a) Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter…shall forfeit
to the United States, irrespective of any provision of State law—
(1) any interest the person has acquired or maintained in violation of
section 1962 [18 USCS § 1962];
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(2) any—
(A) interest in;
(B) security of;
(C) claim against; or
(D) property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of
influence over; any enterprise which the person has established, operated,
controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of
section 1962 [18 USCS § 1962]; and
(3) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the
person obtained, directly or indirectly, in violation of section 1962 [18
USCS § 1962].89
Mandatory asset forfeiture upon the commission of a financial crime was originally
introduced in 197390 and eventually was codified in the Sentencing Guidelines.91 Presently, most
defendants are ordered to pay restitution upon conviction as part of their sentences.92 The
recognition of voluntary asset forfeiture would enhance judicial economy while also restoring
public justice by returning the ill-gained profits to the corporation’s victims. It is also notable that
by virtue of the quasi-criminal nature of the proceeding, corporations could avoid a criminal
conviction and potentially even public scrutiny, which would be a highly appealing consideration.
In exchange for subjecting itself to voluntary asset forfeiture, a corporation should obtain
cooperation credit under the Sentencing Guidelines. Voluntary restitution could conceivably be a
more fruitful approach, as it would ensure that victims are able to promptly recover the funds in
question, as opposed to having to wait for an adjudication, or risk a potential bankruptcy or
depletion of funds prior to mandatory restitution, which occurs upon conviction.
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A foreseeable issue regarding voluntary asset forfeiture would be producing an accurate
valuation. It is likely that even relying on forensic accountants and other experts. Such valuations
would be merely an approximation of the real value of profits obtained through corporate
wrongdoing. A potential solution would be to create a rebuttable presumption in favor of the state
to resolve potential discrepancies in dueling valuations. Contrary to the traditional rule of lenity93,
which is triggered at the time a defendant is charged,94 this proposed rebuttable presumption would
only be applicable after a finding has been made that the corporation engaged in a corporate crime.
This presumption to favor the state’s approximate valuation would further serve as a deterrent to
corporate crime and could potentially minimize the value of a corporation’s cost-benefit analysis
to infer penalty amounts, as Ford did while manufacturing its infamous Pinto. While it may seem
overzealous to create a presumption favoring the state, the presumption would only be applicable
upon the finding explained supra and would be rebuttable in nature, providing a safeguard to
defendants to produce clear and convincing evidence of the accuracy of their proposed valuation.
C.
Restrict the Usage of NPAs and DPAs to Exceptional Circumstances and Subject to
Approval of a Supervising Attorney
Amend the USAM to delineate under what circumstances would it be acceptable to use
NPAs and DPAs to validate the intent reflected in Yates Memo pertaining to individual
accountability. The present DOJ policy in the USAM grants prosecutors broad (and perhaps
excessive) discretion regarding the usage of DPAs. DPAs, in turn, do not contribute to the
deterrence of white-collar crime, as DPAs in and of themselves allow corporations to conduct an
analysis into whether it would be lucrative to expose themselves to a monetary fine, as Ford did in
the Pinto case. Furthermore, DPAs do not help clarify the boundaries of permissible legal conduct
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as they quickly resolve matters without conducting a trial, developing a record, or setting a
precedent for the purpose of stare decisis. Reliance on DPAs should be reserved for exceptional
circumstances, with specific terms discussed with a supervising attorney, and subject to judicial
review and appeal. Except for determining whether a DPA involves misconduct, a district court
has no authority to consider the merits of a DPA.95
The limitation, or even complete eradication, of DPAs, does not equate to the state running
out of prosecutorial mechanisms. The state will still have useful tools to choose from in its toolbox.
For instance, in cases that would actually warrant a DPA, such as cases in which the defendant
(whether it be a corporation or a natural person) commits a minor offense and has no history of
violations, it should not be unfeasible to decline prosecution altogether or to refer the matter for
civil or administrative enforcement and apply the adequate punitive measures through either of
those forums.
D.

Enforce the Yates’ Memo Provision for Prosecuting Individuals
Former Judge Jed Rakoff of the United States District Court of the Southern District of

New York has opined that an endemic problem is the lack of simultaneous prosecutions among
corporations and individuals, an aspect of corporate criminal cases he finds disturbing.96
Prosecuting corporations is a rare occurrence. However, the prosecution of corporations, along
with the prosecution of their managerial agents, is rare.97 “In recent decades, . . . prosecutors have
been increasingly attracted to prosecuting companies, often even without indicting a single
individual.”98
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Just going after the company is . . . both technically and morally suspect. It is
technically suspect because, under the law, you should not indict or threaten to
indict a company unless you can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that some
managerial agent of the company committed the alleged crime; and if you can prove
that, why not indict the manager? And from a moral standpoint, punishing a
company and its many innocent employees and shareholders for the crimes
committed by some unprosecuted individuals seems contrary to elementary notions
of moral responsibility.99
Oddly enough, even after the Yates Memo public message emphasizing individual
prosecutions, such a concept has yet to materialize. Instead, Judge Rakoff believes that the DOJs’
focus on primarily prosecuting corporations was rationalized as part of an attempt to transform
“corporate cultures.”100
The USAM provides in relevant part that “[p]rosecution of a corporation is not a substitute
for the prosecution of criminally culpable individuals within or without the corporation. Because
a corporation can act only through individuals, the imposition of individual criminal liability may
provide the strongest deterrent against future corporate wrongdoing. Only rarely should provable
individual culpability not be pursued…”101 A solution to deter corporate crime would be following
the guidance already reflected in the United States Attorneys’ Manual (USAM) and charging
individuals simultaneously when charging corporations, as intended for when the Yates Memo
was released.102
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CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study has been to expand on the present prosecutorial framework to
widen prosecutorial reach through the suggestion of creative tools while simultaneously ensuring
appropriate safeguards for corporations as defendants. As shown in this Article, corporate
wrongdoing presents unique challenges to criminal procedure, particularly the prosecution of
corporate defendants vis-à-vis natural persons. The plethora of difficulties in light of the absence
of a well-structured legislative framework has generated an unsteady ground for both prosecutors
and defendants alike. Consequently, the lack of legislation that allows for swift policy shifts in the
DOJ regulations for prosecuting corporate crime could occasionally serve as a de facto loophole
to avoid corporate liability.
Legislators should address this pressing dilemma by replacing the inadequate respondeat
superior doctrine to impose liability in corporate criminal cases based on a statute that aligns with
the provisions found in the Model Penal Code. Similarly, a deviation from the standard mandatory
forfeiture to favor voluntary forfeiture in the Sentencing Guidelines could have promising
consequences for courts, as well as all parties involved, by expediting a case while ensuring prompt
and full restitution for victims.
For better or worse, prosecutors have come to depend on settlement agreements to engage
in complex corporate restructuring as means of pursuing justice on behalf of the public. While the
benefits of NPAs and DPAs speak for themselves, transparency should be preserved but must also
be of compulsory nature. In addition, the wide prosecutorial discretion in relying on these
settlement agreements should be streamlined in the interest of public justice. Finally, the DOJ must
be held accountable for its undertaking of seeking individual prosecutions, which is now over a
decade late.
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